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The role of mobile policies in coalition building: the Barcelona 
Model as coalition magnet in Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro 
(1989-1996) 
Abstract 
Research on policy mobility has tended to focus on what moves (e.g. policy models, 
templates) and who moves them (e.g. consultants, international organizations) with less 
attention paid to the relational politics of grounding dominant ideas in local policy 
making. The demand side at the end of the mobilization process (e.g. local authorities 
and policy actors) is usually depicted as passive or as having stable interests. This 
assumption is problematic as it can reinforce taken for granted power asymmetries in the 
flow of urban policy ideas, particularly in cases where cities in the Global North are 
presented as exporting sites for a Global South audience of importing sites. Drawing 
on the concept of policy ideas as coalition magnets from policy studies, this paper 
demonstrates how local policies are relationally produced by cosmopolitan policy actors 
on the demand side who strategically mobilize circulating ideas as a tool for coalition 
building. We provide a relational comparative study of Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiros 
policy processes and urban outcomes in mobilizing the Barcelona model of urban 
regeneration and strategic planning drawing on evidence from interviews, document 
analysis, and the biographies of key policy actors. It demonstrates the strategic 
importance of mobile policies for emerging political actors who employ them as a 
coalition magnet to build support for their governments. 
Keywords 
coalition building, local government, networks, planning, policy mobilities, politics, 
redevelopment/regeneration 
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Introduction  
The website of the development corporation for Buenos Aires Puerto Madero area 
proclaims that the organization is internationally renowned for being responsible for one 
of the most successful urban projects in Latin America (CAPM, 2011). The regeneration 
of the centrally located old port in the Argentinean capital started in 1989 with initial 
plans modelled after Barcelonas renewal of its waterfront. In nearby Brazil, consultants 
from Barcelona also advised the city of Rio de Janeiro in the elaboration of its first 
strategic plan in the early 1990s. The World Bank (1999: 5) praised the initiative as a 
laudable achievement and unprecedented success as an exercise in consensus-building 
and partnership. Yet, in recounting his involvement in both experiences, the Catalan 
urban scholar/politician/consultant Jordi Borja (2010: 221-2) argued that in Latin 
America, the reception of the Barcelona model raises a big moral question for being 
translated as one-off, scattered or intermittent interventions  in the prevailing 
neoliberal framework.  
What do these divergent accounts possibly tell us? Certainly, evaluations about 
the success or failure of policy transfer exercises are in the eye of the beholder. In this 
paper, we examine this dynamic from the perspective of the local authorities and policy 
actors at the receiving end of mobilization processes. We argue that the local politics of 
the demand side have received insufficient attention from the policy mobility literature. 
This assumption is problematic as it can reinforce taken for granted power asymmetries 
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in the direction of flow of urban policy ideas, particularly in cases where cities in the 
Global North are presented as exporting sites for a Global South audience of importing 
sites. Thus, we suggest an analytical framework seeing ideas as coalition magnets, a 
concept borrowed from policy studies, as a way to enable a relational comparative 
analysis of policy processes and urban outcomes (Robinson, 2011a; Ward, 2010). 
Commentators in the policy mobilities literature routinely list the Barcelona 
model as a key example of an urban policy template that is globally circulated (Cochrane 
and Ward, 2012; McCann and Ward, 2011; Peck and Theodore, 2010). It refers to a range 
of policies implemented in the city in the last three decades that significantly transformed 
the urban space and turned the city into a policy mecca (González, 2011). These 
references have circulated through political and professional networks with an important 
presence in Latin American cities. Such circulation has been structured through various 
networks including those of Latin American practitioners  as demonstrated in the cases 
of Medellín, Lima and Montevideo (Brand, 2013; Golda-Pongratz, 2007; Velut and 
Robin, 2005); through numerous intergovernmental cooperation programs and bi-lateral 
agreements (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 1994, 2004); via consulting services including on 
the regeneration of public spaces (e.g. Rosario), large-scale projects (e.g. Santo André) 
and mega-events (e.g. Rio, Monterrey) (Jajamovich, 2012; Montaner et al, 2010; 
Silvestre, 2017); through institutional channels disseminating its planning methods like 
the Iberoamerican Centre of Strategic Urban Development (Steinberg, 2002); and under 
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the tutelage of the World Bank and UN-Habitat through their institutional materials and 
training programs in the region (Borja, 1996; Borja and Castells, 1997). 
This is also the case of the cities of Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro where a 
relationship with Catalan policymakers and professionals was articulated in the late-
1980s and early 1990s. We build upon debates in the policy mobilities literature to 
interrogate claims about policy actors on the demand side using circulating templates to 
narrow policy debates along preferred ideological lines while furthering personal agendas 
(McCann, 2011; Peck and Theodore, 2010). We argue that with few exceptions there has 
been scarce empirical validation of such claims and critical examinations of mobilized 
policy models on the ground. The cases of the two South American cities are ideal for 
this as they present moments of change of urban policy paradigms facilitated by 
cosmopolitan policy actors seeking political support. These cases of political contingency 
and mobile local actors provide a theoretical contribution through a critique of the relative 
passivity and stability of interests often implicit in the literature. In order to capture the 
open-ended process of emerging political actors using circulating templates to build 
coalitions we apply the concept of coalition magnets to examine both support and 
resistance to policy agendas (Béland and Cox, 2016). We therefore combine elements of 
the literature on policy mobilities with policy studies to provide a more nuanced analytical 
framework of relational policy making that accounts to the particular, grounded, 
localized ways in which globalized policies find their expression (Cochrane, 2011: x). 
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This article proceeds with the following structure. In the next section, we review 
debates in the policy mobility literature with reference to the local politics of mobilized 
ideas. The following section presents the methods utilized in the two research projects 
supporting this paper and the relational comparative approach (Ward, 2010) adopted to 
bring them into dialogue. We then present our empirical material and focus on the 
strategic use of waterfront regeneration models and strategic planning with reference to 
Barcelona by policy actors in Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro respectively. We confirm 
previous observations that the flow of policy models from one city to another is rarely 
linear, yet we underscore the importance of taking a relational approach in the analysis of 
local policy making by examining ideas as coalition magnets. In conclusion, we argue 
for a more nuanced analysis of the agency and situated practices of actors at the receiving 
end of the mobilization process and suggest that a greater dialogue with policy studies 
could prove particularly helpful in this regard. 
Grounding mobile policies as coalition magnets  
The call to examine how urban policies are produced in global-relational context 
(McCann and Ward, 2010: 176) has generated a productive line of research in the last 
decade, especially into the dynamics of circulation of urban expertise and in its translation 
into concrete local policies. Scholars have underscored the inherent politics present in the 
process of turning experiences into policy models, in their circulation and in their 
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promotion (Cochrane and Ward, 2012; McCann, 2011; McCann and Ward, 2011; 
Sánchez, 2010). Despite the fast policy quality of contemporary policy making (Peck 
and Theodore, 2015) there is a need for caution to not fetishize the power of fast-moving 
ideas (McCann, 2011; Wood, 2015) and remain mindful that policy is fundamentally 
territorial in that it is tied up with a whole set of locally dependent interests (McCann 
and Ward, 2010: 176). In reference to the receiving end of the policy transfer process, 
three particular claims have been made about the relationship between mobilized ideas 
and the contingent processes of policy making. 
First, policies that work (Peck, 2011) are seen to arrive with ready-made expert 
analysis, and/or moral authority (Sorensen, 2010: 135) that can preclude opposition 
while rendering the debate on technical terms (i.e. how it works). Second, mobilized 
ideas are rarely the result of a rational process of policymakers scanning the world 
(McCann, 2011) but are expressions of ideological alignments that pre-conditions the 
transfer of knowledge (Peck and Theodore, 2010). Third, circulating models are often 
used to support particular agendas and further local interests (Robinson, 2011b). 
Nevertheless, few studies have validated these claims and engaged in-depth with how 
policy is localized (Temenos and Baker, 2015: 842), translated, interpreted, adapted 
(Healey, 2010), and also contested. 
 In particular, the demand side is more often than not displayed in relative passivity 
regarding the mobilization process. The focus of agency has invariably been on powerful 
7 
 
mobile actors actively promoting policy knowledge, such as boosters and the global 
consultocracy (McCann, 2011; Rapoport and Hult, 2017), with less attention paid to the 
extrospective orientation (McCann, 2013) and practices of the actors on the demand 
side. Bunnell et al (2018: 1067) have called for the need to pay greater attention to the 
analysis of individual elected officials and to the middling actors performing much of 
the translation tasks. Exceptions to this have been the analyses of Temenos and McCann 
(2012) and Wood (2014). In the former study, the authors demonstrated how local 
policymakers imported a circulating sustainability framework as a policy fix to narrow 
local planning debates to a direction that accommodated both economic growth and 
environmental concerns. In the latter study, the author examined how local intermediaries 
instrumentally connected international consultants with decision makers in the adoption 
of Bus Rapid Transit systems in South African cities (Wood, 2014). Both cases highlight 
not only how policy is made up on the ground by drawing on circulating models 
(Temenos and McCann, 2012: 1394) but also the active role of local policy actors in 
preparing the ground for mobile policy templates in a way that is sensitive to the local 
political dynamics. 
To a certain extent, both studies characterize local actors as stable interests and 
uncontested forces. Our contribution to this discussion is to add another level of 
contingency in the mobilization process, that of emerging policy actors seeking to 
position themselves in the political landscape by drawing on mobile ideas to build 
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coalitions. In exploring the mobilization of urban expertise from Barcelona, we analyze 
the ways in which apparently distant phenomena can be drawn in by political actors 
to develop political initiatives and to build political power and authority (Cochrane, 
2011: xi). Here the Barcelona model is mobilized as a vaguely defined set of different 
policies implemented in that city that were decontextualized of its social, political and 
economic contexts in order to travel and appeal to different audiences. We examine the 
extent to which the model served to what Béland and Cox (2016: 429) call coalition 
magnets; policy ideas that are strategically used to frame interests, mobilize supporters 
and build coalitions. The authors contend that highly ambiguous and polysemic ideas 
can better serve in the formation of a coalition than narrowly-defined ideas, something 
that we argue to be particularly relevant to examine emerging political forces and their 
ability to gather support, as in the case of the new mayors of Buenos Aires and Rio de 
Janeiro in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Following Béland and Cox (2016), in the empirical section of this paper three 
processes are examined in the roles of waterfront regeneration and strategic planning via 
Barcelona to serve as coalition magnets. First, it is analyzed how these were presented as 
novel constructions that reframed existing policy problems in creative ways. Second, it is 
examined how these ideas were taken up and promoted by key actors in the policy 
process. Finally, it is evaluated how these new policy ideas served as coalition magnets 
to bring together actors who were not previously engaged by awakening a policy 
9 
 
preference in the[ir] minds  [on a] particular issue (ibid: 429). The next section details 
the methods used in the research of the two case studies and in their consequent comparative 
analysis. 
Methods  
In this paper, we offer a relational comparative approach (Ward, 2010) to examine urban 
policy change in two cities. The relational aspect lies in underscoring how local policy 
making mobilizes knowledge through relations with other cities and in examining how 
globally circulating practices are negotiated at the local level (McCann and Ward, 2010). 
We straddle between the spatio-historical specificities of our two cases as well as the 
interconnections they share (Hart, 2018: 373). The comparison is not, in a more 
traditional sense, a systematic study of similarity and difference among cities or urban 
processes (Nijman, 2007:1). Rather, our focus is on processes and relations not things: the 
principle is that elements, things, and structures do not exist prior to the processes and relations 
that create, sustain, or undermine them (Hart, 2016: 378). We are interested in comparing 
both the policy relations of the two cities with the same site of policy expertise and the 
ensuing situated and contingent processes of grounding such knowledge. Following 
Robinson (2016), we use tracing as a methodological tactic while employing a twofold 
comparative strategy: genetic in following the shared policy connections in Buenos 
Aires and Rio de Janeiro with Barcelona; and generative in examining how these 
engagements presented similar features but also had different outcomes. In summary, 
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tracing in a relational comparative approach involves outlining the connections and their 
influence on the comparable instance (Wood, 2019: 8). 
The analysis draws on two separate larger studies of mobile policies and relational 
local policy making. Carried independently, both projects focused on the changing 
paradigms of urban planning policies in Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro and their 
material expression through large-scale regeneration projects. In both cases, the presence 
of consultants from Barcelona and the articulation of policies with reference to that city 
was an important feature and provided a methodological entry point to think 
comparatively. 
The first project focused on the Puerto Madero development from 1989 to 2017. 
The empirical material on which it is based included 25 interviews undertaken between 
June 2010 and January 2016. It also included documentary research of Puerto Madero 
Corporations archives, policy documents and newspaper articles. The second project 
examined the urban politics in Rio de Janeiro from the advent of a conservative local 
government in 1993 until 2016. A total of 66 interviews were undertaken between June 
2012 and January 2015 supplemented with the analysis of official documents related to 
the citys strategic plan and local newspapers. Purposive sampling was used in the 
selection of participants. We identified individuals involved in drafting and implementing 
the two policies (e.g. names listed in official documents, proposals, committees) as well 
as those involved through consultations (listed in minutes) or who presented public 
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objections (e.g. professional associations, political opposition). This was combined with 
snowball sampling, as some participants suggested other names and facilitated the 
recruitment of some of the elite actors. Altogether, the interviews included former 
mayors, heads of the planning office, Catalan consultants, senior civil servants and other 
actors involved in the production of the local policies. 
In tracing policy connections, we probe the backstory of processes rendering 
certain cities as models (Ward, 2013) from the perspective of Southern cities while 
considering how such practices were first disseminated in the region. In order to avoid 
the presentism sometimes articulated as a critique to the policy mobilities literature 
(Harris and Moore, 2013; Jacobs and Lees, 2013), we reconstitute historical events and 
trace policy exchanges through an analysis of key policy actors. Their career paths are 
historicized (Jajamovich, 2016) through biographies, publications and semi-structured 
interviews while examining their circulation in international networks of policy and 
professional practice. It allows us to highlight the role of individuals in circulating urban 
policies and plans (Healey, 2010; Larner and Laurie, 2010), and to introduce a historical 
perspective in grappling with why and how local actors choose to learn from the 
Barcelona experience in a context where other port redevelopment experiences, public-
private partnerships and strategic planning strategies were available.  
This, however, supposed some methodological challenges. Official documents are 
designed to tell stories that smooth out contested histories and give linear accounts of 
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success. In addition, public biographies and interviews involve seamless post-facto 
rationalizations in which ambivalence, multiple motivations, dilemmas, and failures are 
concealed (Chamberlain and Leydesdorft, 2004). Thus, it was necessary to combine and 
compare accessible materials with the more private stories that make up personal 
biographies and careers. We proceeded to draw together the interviews with multiple 
primary sources relating to the different stages and stakeholders involved (such as civil 
servants, elected officials, business leaders) and thus to reconstruct the relational 
character of the processes under analysis.  
Policy change and the circulation of the Barcelona model in Latin America  
The circulation of policy knowledge analyzed here took place at a time of significant 
change in the context of Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro. Starting in the 1970s and 
throughout the 1990s, Argentina and Brazil faced profound structural economic and 
political transformations that accompanied economic crises and that put an end to the 
previous expansive and developmental cycle. In both cases, the return to democracy 
was recent, with military dictatorships ending in Argentina in 1983 and in Brazil in 1985. 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) set by the International Monetary Fund as a 
condition to access loans, incurred in the implementation of neoliberal macroeconomic 
policies with a direct impact in worsening social inequality (Portes and Roberts, 2005). 
In 1989, both countries held general elections won by candidates committed to a free-
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market model that included economic liberalization, the privatization of state-owned 
companies, and partnerships with the private sector. 
 The city of Buenos Aires, whose mayor Carlos Grosso was appointed by the 
president of the country - it was not still an autonomous government - was also 
implementing a privatization program. Although Grosso was the leader of the Peronist 
party at the city and declared to prefer a social democratic neoliberalism, like that of 
[Spanish President] Felipe González to what he describes as Menems Thatcherite 
policies (quoted in Levistky, 2003: 148). His mayoral term lasted until his resignation 
amid corruption charges in 1992. Puerto Madero redevelopment project was the hallmark 
of his government and contributed to boost his reputation at the national level. Architect 
Alfredo Garay was recruited as Secretary of Urban Planning, having previously worked 
for other local governments during the 1980s. Garay maintained and reinforced previous 
relations with Spanish connections like Jordi Borja and played an important role in the 
Puerto Madero redevelopment project including the mobilization of Catalan expertise to 
Buenos Aires. 
 Elected in 1992, Rio de Janeiros mayor Cesar Maia campaigned on the ticket of 
disciplining the urban disorder  in reference to increasing economic informality and 
criminality  while extolling the virtues of new management instruments such as strategic 
planning as a way to modernize the public administration (Maia, 1998). Maia credited his 
knowledge about the instrument to his foreign training while a federal congressman in the 
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1980s in political programs run by Germany-based Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Maia, 
2004; Lima Júnior, 2010). There, he learnt about European experiences in developing 
strategic plans and the need to work with actors directly involved with the production of 
the city. He then recruited Luiz Paulo Conde, a practicing architect and an influential 
scholar who quickly became his right-hand person and was later elected as his successor. 
Conde, who was of Spanish descent and had professional links with Barcelona, became a 
key intermediary in establishing the connection with the Catalan consultants. 
On the part of the consultants, Latin America was identified as a significant 
market as long as there is a generous offer to transfer technology, training of human 
capital and modern infrastructures (Borja, 1992: 23-24). The years preceding and in the 
aftermath of the 1992 Olympic Games provided a conjunctural moment for the 
extramunicipal politics of Barcelonas City Hall with numerous initiatives of international 
engagement taking place (McNeill, 2001). As the head of the international relations 
office, Jordi Borja led many of these, particularly in Latin America where he had long-
standing scholarly and personal connections (interview Borja, November 2012). In 1989, 
he helped to create Tecnologies Urbanes Barcelona SA (TUBSA), a holding of city-based 
public and private companies offering consulting services in diverse areas such as traffic 
engineering, sanitation, geoprocessing and public management. It offered the transfer of 
know-how to other governments and assistance in the preparation of loan applications to 
international development agencies. It was claimed that the initiative demonstrated that 
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Barcelona City Hall was the only European institution that, through its companies, ha[d] 
undertaken the adventure of opening foreign markets ... and through TUBSA, Barcelona 
export[ed]s itself (Farreras, 1989: 47). 
In the two cases that follow, the first interactions of the Barcelona model in the 
region are analyzed within a particular period (1989-1996) marked by the hosting of the 
1992 Olympic Games in that city, considered a turning point in putting the city on the 
map (Borja, 1996: 22). In other words, at the time Barcelona was still considered a 
secondary city and of limited international exposure (ibid). The presence of the Catalan 
experts in Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro was presented as an important sign of prestige 
in policy reports while the local media reported how the model was starting to be 
exported and how the work in the two cities would be important to open new markets 
(Borja, 1993).  We proceed to the cases by tracing the connections established between 
the cities that allowed knowledge to circulate (pathways of tracing as in Wood, 2019), 
by interrogating the consultants traces in policy documents supported by accounts from 
policy actors, and analyzing the effects of these engagements on urban outcomes. 
Buenos Aires Puerto Madero waterfront redevelopment 
Tracing the Buenos Aires-Barcelona connection 
Urban proposals for Puerto Madero developed by foreign experts can be traced back to 
the late 1920s with Le Corbusiers ideas for Buenos Aires and its port. Also, and more 
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related to the Buenos Aires-Barcelona connection, contacts between experts and 
politicians from both cities began many years before the redevelopment project started in 
the 1990s, albeit within different political contexts. 
Architect Alfredo Garays career path is related to Jordi Borjas. He went into 
exile after the 1976 coup détat in Argentina going first to Belgium and later moving to 
Mexico where he worked as an urban planner and met other experts such as Borja. After 
the end of the dictatorship and the beginning of the democratic transition, Garay returned 
to Argentina and started working in the public sector. During that period, he published 
articles in books edited by Borja and supported by the Argentine-Hispanic cooperation 
program. In the 1990s, he headed the Secretariat of Urban Planning of the city of Buenos 
Aires, where he oversaw the Puerto Madero Project.  
 In a typical case of urban policy tourism (González, 2010), mayor Carlos Grosso 
travelled to Barcelona in 1989 before taking over the Intendancy of Buenos 
Aires.  According to Borja (1990: 9), Grosso was invited to participate in  [a] seminar 
on international transfer of urban technologies. He then disclosed that one of his first 
initiatives would be to recover the old port ('Puerto Madero') for the city and required an 
important international collaboration'. 
Personal contacts played a role in this process. According to Borja, Grosso was 
a friend of my [Argentinian] girlfriend - with whom I married. He came to the wedding 
as well. And besides, both my partner and I were friends of Fredy Garay (interview 
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Borja, October 2011). Garay, on the other hand, explained that ...Jordi [Borja] was a rare 
character in Barcelona because he worked as Deputy Mayor, that is, he was elected but 
he was dedicated to international policy (...) Jordi was travelling around Latin America 
all the time  (interview Garay, August 2010).  
Cultural ties were also important. According to Jorge Moscato, a former member 
of the urban planning council during Grossos government:  
Barcelona had and has a huge irradiation capacity. How many cities in Latin America 
have taken the Barcelona model? ... Barcelona is Paris but in Spanish, it has a faster and 
closer translation (interview Moscato, October 2011).  
In summary, Barcelona-Buenos Aires connections had a history before Puerto Madero 
redevelopment juxtaposing experts and policy actors personal contacts, cultural ties, and 
urban knowledge networks. But, as we will see next, only under certain conjunctures 
these connections would get materialized as large-scale urban projects.     
Restructuring Buenos Aires and the Catalan proposal 
The mobilization of favored models and practices requires politically structured fields of 
ongoing experimentation  [and] ongoing and grounded forms of institutional 
ideological restructuring (Peck, 2011: 21). It is thus necessary to analyze political and 
economic frameworks in which exchanges with Barcelonas consultants were situated 
and grounded and to interrogate the problems they sought to solve. Following Béland and 
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Coxs (2016) analytical framework, local politics of mobilized knowledge need to be 
analyzed in order to show how the Barcelona model of waterfront regeneration was 
presented as a novel construction that reframed existing policy problems, how these ideas 
were taken up and promoted by key actors in the policy process and how they served - or 
not - as coalition magnets to bring together actors who were not previously engaged  
The Historic Puerto Madero Corporation (CAPMSA) was created ias a public 
entity, tasked with developing a financial, regulatory, and physical plan that would secure 
the development of the port, reflecting - and producing - wider changes in urban 
governance and management. In 1989, the federal government transferred ownership of 
this sector of the port to the new corporation which would receive no public resources 
besides the land transfer and would generate its own revenue to cover operating costs 
(Garay et al., 2013: 3).   
CAPMSA could mediate jurisdictional problems because it incorporated local and 
national government agents. It was integrated by a six-member board of directors - four 
representing the national government and two representing the city government - and a 
professional management body. Initially the management structure was integrated by 
around thirty people who carried out the daily operation. Its presidency rotated yearly 
between the two levels of governments represented (Garay et al., 2013).  
CAPMSA presented a public-private model of urban management reflexive of the 
neoliberal policies pursued under Menems presidency. It was an active part of the 
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emergence of entrepreneurial urban governance arrangements (Ward, 2006) in Buenos 
Aires. Although it is a public entity, it works autonomously from traditional local 
legislative powers in order to enhance the development of the area. That is, free from civil 
service rules and bureaucratic procedures.  
The Catalan experience in the redevelopment of the port area and the strategic 
urban planning perspective helped Grosso and Garay to reframe existing policy problems: 
how to urbanize the port area in a context of economic and state crisis and beyond 
modernist urban planning  and to engage the national government in this initiative. As 
Garay recounted: 
What I learned with them [the Catalan experts] is to look at how the real estate market 
works. In an operation of this size, you need to understand who are the ones who build 
the city and what products they make ... I learned that we didn't have to think about this 
as merely an architectural project, but what conditions you have to have for investors in 
large buildings to prefer to come here and not to another side (interview Garay, August 
2010). 
Thus, CAMPSA also epitomized a change in urban planners role as an investment promoter. 
According to Garay, urban planners should be ... capable not only of designing well, but of setting 
up businesses that mean work, economic movement, convincing others to take risks to get out of 
economic recession (quoted in Gorelik and Silvestri, 1990: 22). 
 The Puerto Madero redevelopment project was also part of a wider strategy 
seeking to avoid Buenos Aires urban sprawl (Garay, 2007). After the creation of 
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CAPMSA, mayor Grosso with Garays advice commissioned a master plan for Puerto 
Madero to Catalan consultants through a cooperation program signed in 1985. This 
agreement involved the input of the European Associate Consultants (CEA) - formed by 
Catalan architect Joan Busquets and the economist Joan Alemany with the collaboration 
of Borja, as head of TUBSA. 
 In July 1990, they proposed the Strategic Plan for Historic Puerto Madero 
(SPHPM) (CEA, 1990). Secretary Garay explained that the involvement of Catalan 
experts was a way to legitimize that policy (interview Garay, August 2010) and in this 
way it was expected to serve as a coalition magnet to bring together actors who were not 
previously engaged.. 
In the introduction to the plan, Borja positioned it as the first phase of a broader 
cooperation, which was intended to strengthen links between Buenos Aires and Barcelona 
and their respective enterprises and experts:  
The development of the Strategic Plan can and should lead to a much closer collaboration 
between Buenos Aires and Barcelona, between companies and professionals from 
Argentina and Spain ... a mixed partnership (or more than one) Hispanic-Argentinean can 
be an effective instrument to manage a cooperation that can cover the urbanization of the 
area and the management of projects, the execution of action programs and the selection 
of investors (Borja, 1990: 10-11).  
The SPHPM was a project-led planning proposal prioritizing urban management, 
urban design and critical to abstract and regulatory modern planning. This project offered 
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a high density of residential and commercial land use as a means of attracting investments 
and ensuring the projects economic viability, thereby orienting the proposal to a specific 
and exclusive socioeconomic group. In a context of economic and state crisis, linkages to 
public-private partnerships were also developed within the proposed engineering 
management component; an administration system with public initiative and control 
(setting the priorities, timing, and scale of operations) and private involvement and 
financing. 
A coalition magnet? Contestations and outcomes 
Despite being championed by key policy actors, international experts and consultants, the 
plan received strong public criticism. It generated resistance that led to changes within 
the local context, thereby establishing a series of discussions on the links between plans 
and projects, public and private actors, and foreign and local actors. The Central Society 
of Architects (SCA) -  the association of architects of the city of Buenos Aires - contested 
the legitimacy of the foreign experts, criticized the lack of involvement of local architects 
as well as the absence of a city-wide comprehensive plan that included the Puerto Madero 
project, and proclaimed that the SPHPM was dominated by real estate interests (Keselman 
and del Franco, 1991). It recommended halting the process in order to review the program, 
the project and the implementation strategies through consensus building and broader 
participation.   
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In defense of the local government perspective and attacking modernist urban 
planning perspectives, Garay argued that Puerto Madero implied a shift in state 
intervention:  
Puerto Madero is not a single large-scale intervention ... it is basically a joint venture 
between a company that owns the land and one or several firms that make the investment 
in the infrastructure, sell the lots and others that buy a lot and build a building (Garay 
quoted in Summa, 1991: 10).  
Due to all the criticisms and conflicts generated the original SPHPM was discarded. Local 
architects were subsequently involved, and in July 1991 the SCA organized a competition 
of ideas supported by the City Council of Buenos Aires. The abandonment of the SPHPM 
and the involvement of the SCA guaranteed wider political support and for a broader 
coalition to be established. The public contest brought together actors whose perceived 
interests or policy preferences had previously placed them at odds with one another 
(Béland and Cox, 2016: 429). In other words, the contest worked to retool the coalition 
magnet: while some original provisions were maintained, changes were made without 
detriment to the larger conceptual framing of the policy problem. For instance, while 
the coverage of land use was reduced, the SCA no longer claimed that a wider 
comprehensive plan was needed.  The combination of sale systems and land grants 
presented in the Catalan proposal was also left behind in favor of simply prioritizing sale 
systems. Mayor Grosso and secretary Garay supported the involvement of SCA in the 
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project retaining the main suggestions of the Spanish consultancy: a management system 
with public initiative and private funding.   
 In summary, while the SPHPM was finally rejected and the international 
consultants no longer involved, strategic urban planning and project-led planning 
remained. Political contingency was part of this process. Far away from passivity and 
stability of interests, the emerging political actors tested and consequently altered it in 
order to enable a policy coalition to take hold.  
Rio de Janeiros Strategic Plan 
Tracing the Rio-Barcelona connection  
Rios Mayor Cesar Maia first came in contact with strategic plans after visiting Madrid 
in the early 1990s when he was introduced to the work of consulting group Arthur 
Andersen in the development of the plan in the city (Maia, 1998). Keen to emulate the 
practice in his government, the reference would shift to Barcelona after Borja visited Rio 
in 1992 and was introduced to the secretary of urban planning, Luiz Paulo Conde 
(interview Borja, November 2012). The two actors circulated in different networks, as the 
architect recounted: I knew [Barcelonas head of planning department, architect Oriol] 
Bohigas ... Jordi was more of a sociologist, like [Manuel] Castells. They were not 
architects (Lima Júnior, 2010: 151). The two discussed opportunities to work together 
including the experience of Barcelona with its first strategic plan. 
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Strategic planning was defined by the consultants as a management tool for 
conceiving a desirable future, and for defining the means to get there (Forn and Pascual, 
1995: 13). It consists of a diagnosis of the current situation of the city, the setting of 
social/economic/environmental objectives to be reached and an identification of policy 
responses to achieve them. Promoted as a response to global economic restructuring 
processes, it argued for a consensual vision to be defined by public and private actors and 
materialized through strategic urban projects to make the city more competitive (Borja 
and Castells, 1997). The increasing interest in the instrument led the consultants to draw 
on the method implemented in Barcelona and offer it as part of their services.  
After returning from a fact-finding trip to Barcelona, Conde pitched TUBSA 
services to the mayor (Maia, 1998). The relationship was sealed with the organization of 
a seminar held in Rio in 1993 that presented Barcelonas urban policies to an audience of 
senior civil servants. Participants learned details about the transformation of Barcelona 
into a European city in the list of the great urban centers and present at all the 
comparative rankings, including investment and analysis on services and transports 
(Forn, 1993: 12). 
The selection of the policy model to follow in this case confirms the claim that 
objects of emulation are chosen by their representational power and the policy 
imaginary of the demand side (Peck and Theodore, 2010). According to a senior planning 
officer who worked closely with Conde, the architect argued to the mayor: lets go with 
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Barcelona because Rio looks more like Barcelona, I think the issue of public space has 
more to offer (interview senior planner, October 2013). Strategic planning made in 
Barcelona thus arrived in Rio as a ready-made policy template facilitated by the 
international activities of local policy actors. However, this was not an isolated episode. 
Maia credited to his administration a systematic approach to municipal diplomacy that 
stimulated the travel of civil servants and information exchange (interview Maia, 
December 2013). Citing examples taken from France, Italy and Spain, the mayor argued 
that these activities facilitated a learning process from minor questions such as designing 
classrooms to wider issues such as sustainability. Nevertheless, none of these would 
rival the impact created by strategic planning. 
Strategic planning as coalition magnet 
The Rio de Janeiro of the early 1990s was a receptive ground for the polysemic 
idea represented by strategic planning. Whilst the social agendas for housing and access 
to public services became dominant since the return to democracy, the rolling out of 
neoliberal policies coordinated at the national level emphasized the limited capacity of 
the state to address demands while championing the private sector as a partner. The ability 
of strategic planning to serve as a coalition magnet displayed three qualities. First, it 
framed existing policy problems through a narrative of positioning the city in relation to 
globalizing processes. The rising levels of unemployment, violence, informality and 
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deindustrialization were framed as indicators of an urban crisis that required a collective 
response. The loss of the federal capital status of Rio was articulated to resonate more 
strongly by arguing that the city presented a scenario of relative stagnation, low self-
esteem and an undefined position in relation to its future and its role (PCRJ, 1994: 1). 
This required a strategy to define a regional positioning conscious that at the end of this 
century cities will be even closer and integrated in a global network (ibid). 
Normative claims about how cities should respond to the new economic 
orthodoxy dominated the consultancy reports. It argued for the need to change the 
conditions for attracting capital, investments and high skills while asserting that [i]n 
todays world the city has to be competitive (PCRJ, 1996: 11). Cities such as Barcelona, 
Madrid, and San Francisco were referenced for having accepted the challenge for 
change and for identifying projects that made them more attractive for the branches of 
transnational companies (PCRJ, 1993: 5). The leadership of public and private actors 
and the mobilization of society were also presented as necessary conditions, claiming that 
[o]nly in this way it is possible to create channels and processes for participation that 
enable planning to deliver and to continue as it is done in the private sector (PCRJ, 1995: 
8). 
Second, key policy actors such as the mayor and the secretary of planning quickly 
embraced and promoted the instrument,  adopting the idea, as (Béland and Cox, 2016: 441) 
suggest, to advocate not only for specific proposals, but for conceptual understandings of policy 
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issues and problems that legitimate and build support for their proposals. Lima Junior (2010) 
analyzed how strategic planning appealed to Maias self-styled presentation as a 
pragmatic leader while enabling him to articulate support for his government. It afforded 
him to be seen as a cosmopolitan and modernizing mayor. He was reported to have 
circulated copies of chapters of Borja and Castells book Local and Global to his cabinet 
staff (Menezes, 2000) describing how cities had to reinvent themselves. In reference to 
Conde, local commentators described strategic planning as heaven-sent for giving the 
secretary the legitimacy to confront (demoralized) traditional planning sectors within the 
municipality (interview urban scholar, December 2011). The secretary made sweeping 
institutional reforms to facilitate project-led planning and to enable architects to become 
responsible for the production of space in the city (interview architect, November 2013). 
Third, strategic planning enabled these two emerging political actors to engage 
with other relevant partners. Following the recommendation of the consultants, they 
sought the support of the local business associations. The chair of the Chamber of 
Commerce of Rio de Janeiro (ACRJ) recounted that although having limited previous 
interactions with them, they invited him to work together, to which he responded: Thats 
all I want!. Thats how the idea of the strategic plan was conceived (interview business leader, 
November 2013). For ACRJ, an institution representing the interests of local private 
companies, the participation opened a space of institutional engagement at a time when 
waves of violence were affecting businesses activities. The chair garnered the support 
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from other groups to pay for TUBSA consulting fees while the municipality facilitated 
the secondment of staff and contributions in kind (PCRJ, 1993). 
Public participation was stressed as the main virtue of strategic planning with 
objectives defined according to a consensus. However, some participants highlighted the 
tokenistic character of the process of consultation and how it legitimized pre-defined 
agendas: 
It looked as a way for the government to try to do a plan that it believed was participatory. 
Actually, it wasnt you didnt have important debates. The city hall presented its 
projects saying, I will do this, I will do that, they were going ahead anyway. It was an 
attempt to leverage support to the projects of the city hall (interview formed head of 
municipal planning institute, November 2013). 
The group responsible for steering Rio de Janeiros strategic plan brought together a range 
of actors with varied interests. The final strategic plan presented in 1996 conciliated the 
agendas of these groups that influenced and defined the debates. It outlined themes, 
objectives, and aims while listing projects already in progress as strategic for the future 
of the city (PCRJ, 1996). 
Contestations and outcomes  
The publication of Rios strategic plan coincided with increasing support for Maias 
government. The media coverage highlighted the truce for the future (Jornal do Brasil, 
1995) while urging mayoral candidates running in the 1996 elections to pledge their 
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commitment to abide by the plan. It was described as a turning point from turbulent times 
as if the city was awakening from a long and dark winter (O Globo, 1996: 6). The plan 
was instrumental for two outcomes: for facilitating a political coalition and for displacing 
instruments of a more participatory character. 
The newly formed coalition successfully supported the mayoral election of 
Secretary Conde to succeed Maia in 1996. The relationship between the municipality and 
business groups became more straightforward with the creation of an urban development 
agency chaired by the head of ACRJ. Maia returned to office in 2000 and was 
subsequently re-elected, although internal conflicts within his party led him to distance 
himself from Conde and ACRJ. 
Dissonant voices came from trade unions and academics, critical to the arbitrary 
frameworks dictated by the steering group (Azevedo, 1995; Vainer, 2000). Most 
importantly, the institutionalization of strategic planning marginalized instruments like 
participatory master planning, enshrined in the 1988 federal constitution to make urban 
policy making processes more democratic. According to a leader of the opposition, it 
institutionalized a competing rationale that served to dismantle the previous democratic 
interventions (interview former councilor, December 2013). Key planning staff 
responsible for participatory planning processes were also directly affected: 
When there are major changes  in this case above all a political orientation that was 
pushed back and a new group came to power  it is natural for relocation to take place  
30 
 
this happened to me, to my colleagues. We had to part in other ways. (interview planning 
official, October 2013) 
Looking in retrospect, TUBSA consultants evaluated the results as limited. Borja (2012: 
170-171) claimed that the plan was reduced to the complicity between the city 
government and business leaders with no effective popular participation. Another 
consultant complained that rather than becoming a key policy guidance, what was left 
was a more ideological vision than a practical one (interview consultant, June 2012). 
Nevertheless, as it was described, the gains in mobilizing strategic planning to Rio by 
emerging political actors had less to do with the final product than to gather support and 
establish a coalition base. The following final section evaluates the comparative 
experiences of Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro in mobilizing the Barcelona model.       
Conclusion  
This paper has used the analytical framework of ideas as coalition magnets to examine 
how emerging policy actors mobilize circulating policies in an attempt to build support 
for their governments and for key political projects. It demonstrates how local policies 
are relationally produced by, on the one hand mobilizing knowledge through relations 
with other cities, while on the other hand emphasizing the contingent processes of 
gathering support but also of contestation. It thus helps in providing a more nuanced lens 
to examine how mobile policies are grounded and crafted through the coming together of 
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different interests claiming to replicate successful practices. The policy mobilities 
literature often depicts the demand side as consisting of pre-existing stable coalitions with 
relative passivity in the attempt to localize models. The paper contributes in adding a level 
of contingency in the process when new policy actors mobilize policy ideas as an 
instrument for coalition building. 
The analyses of policy change examined emphasize both the territorial and the 
relational histories and geographies that are behind [the] production and (re)production 
of cities (Ward, 2010: 480). In the two cases we put to work Robinsons (2016) suggestion 
to use tracing as a methodological tactic to allow a basis of comparison in two ways. 
Firstly, by tracing the genetic empirical connections of related but distinctive, urban 
outcomes (ibid: 22). Starting from the engagements of local policy makers in Buenos 
Aires and Rio de Janeiro with experts from Barcelona  evidenced in the material traces 
of policy and planning documents (see Wood, 2019)  we followed the career paths of 
key policy actors (mayors, heads of planning departments, consultants) to find that both 
policy exporters as well as importers were highly mobile, had entangled trajectories 
of political and professional practice, and established strategic relations when 
opportunities arose. This attenuates assumed power asymmetries in the process of policy 
circulation. 
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Secondly, the cases also demonstrate how tracing can be used as generative of 
conceptual insights through theoretical conversations which enable global urban studies 
(Robinson 2016: 23). The extramunicipal networks that Barcelona city hall established 
with other cities created what Wood (2019) calls pathways of tracing through which 
circulated not only particular spatial strategies to restructure the urban space (such as 
strategic plans or waterfront regeneration) but also a lens to interpret globalizing 
processes and how local authorities should respond to it. At the conjuncture of socio-
political and economic changes in Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s and 1990s the 
lessons resonated with dominant discourses of neoliberal globalization at the time and 
helped to naturalize partnerships between the public and private sectors (stimulated by 
SAPs and initiated at the central government level). We applied the analytical framework 
of ideas as coalition magnets to enable a processual approach capable of illuminating 
three moments in the strategic and contested grounding of the Barcelona model. First, by 
examining how the consultants were able to skillfully define, disseminate and establish 
the relevance of the idea for the policy prescriptions they advocate[d] (Béland and Cox, 
2016: 441) Second, by analyzing how key policy actors as the mayors and heads of 
planning offices identified in such lessons elements to advance their political and 
professional projects. Finally, by interrogating how this was employed to create new 
coalitions with some elite groups while strategically distancing from others. In Rio, this 
resulted in important political dividends as the making of the strategic plan helped a 
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political group to come together and to give them an identity. In the Buenos Aires case, 
this was more contested as one vocal stakeholder contested its exclusion and was later 
incorporated with the model further appropriated. In both cases the mobilization of 
policies from elsewhere rather than extending or reaffirming power, were used by new 
actors to develop their power base and to build coalitions. In this way, linking the 
literature of policy mobilities to that of policy studies furthers the way local policy making 
can be examined through a relational perspective.  
Further research is required into deliberate attempts to ground mobile policy 
models as a strategy to generate political support and set the policy agenda, especially in 
the Global South. More nuanced views of the power relations between sites characterized 
as exporters and importers can reveal the more levelled ground of interaction and 
historical entanglement that bring together not only politicians, practitioners and 
consultants but also activists and social movements who are enrolled in the development 
and circulation of policy ideas. This is very timely given the current volatility in (but not 
restricted to) current Latin America politics with political outsiders challenging the 
status quo being elected. If uncertainty is a fundamental feature of contemporary politics, 
the mobilization of circulating policy ideas offers the prospect for emerging political 
forces to question existing arrangements and create stability (Blyth, 2010) and thus 
requiring researchers to unravel new forms of knowledge networks.        
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